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My Summer Vacation at the European Commission

Jonathan B. Baker

A

Among the more than 100 jurisdictions with active competition policy regimes today, the United
States has the distinction of starting first, creating the most extensive set of judicial precedents,
and possessing the largest and most experienced enforcement institutions. Antitrust institutions
in the United States have long stood at the summit on any scale of international prestige and influence in the competition policy field. Yet any such ranking would also undoubtedly indicate that
during the last decade or so, the antitrust institutions of the European Union have grown in size
and sophistication to the point where they are comparably respected and as influential as their
U.S. counterparts. In recent years, as competition policy has spread throughout the world, nations
newly adopting antitrust enforcement have been more likely to emulate Europe than the United
States.
I had an unusual opportunity to observe antitrust enforcement in this other leading jurisdiction
during the past summer when I was invited to visit the major European competition policy agency,
the Competition Directorate of the European Commission (DG-Comp), in Brussels. My frame of
reference comes largely from my past positions at the two federal antitrust agencies in the United
States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). I was not at DG-Comp for long, and only had a chance to follow directly a small
fraction of agency activity, focusing on merger review and guidelines drafting. But I also spoke
with many people holding a wide range of positions throughout the organization and with a number of outside lawyers who practice before DG-Comp. My primary interest was the role of economic analysis in merger review.
At DG-Comp, I saw much that I recognized from my U.S. enforcement experience. The agency
has a large and energetic professional staff. The members of the staff are bright and hardworking, with high morale. A decision-making meeting among senior officials reminded me in some
respects of a meeting of the FTC. EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes, the political official in sole
charge of DG-Comp, was joined at the conference table by senior agency administrators (the



rough equivalents of the Director, Deputy Director, and Associate Director of the FTC’s Bureau of
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Competition), the case or project team, personal advisors in her Cabinet (something like an FTC

Professor of Law,

Commissioner’s attorney advisors, but with greater line authority), a representative of the European

Washington College

Commission’s Legal Service (who played a role resembling that of the FTC’s General Counsel) and

of Law, American

the Chief Economist (roughly comparable to the Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics). In

University. He is indebt-

one non-case policy discussion, the Commissioner and her advisors paid attention to protecting

ed to Svend Albaek,

collegial relations with the Commissioners in charge of other Directorates in a manner that remind-

Andrew Gavil, Randolph

ed me not so much of the FTC, but more of the way senior officials in White House agencies like

Tritell, and Stephen A.

the Council of Economic Advisers, where I once worked, prepare for interagency working group

Ryan for comments.

meetings.
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Merger Enforcement
I was particularly interested in comparing merger enforcement at DG-Comp with what I recall from
my service at the FTC and DOJ. As in the United States, merger investigations at DG-Comp focus
on the welfare of consumers, and economic analysis is taken seriously. The European equivalent
of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines sets forth a careful, economic approach to merger analysis that closely resembles the U.S. approach. In both jurisdictions, the merger guidelines help
agency staff frame their investigations and help the merging parties shape their submissions. On
the whole, DG-Comp undertakes merger review in a way that is comparable to how the U.S.
enforcement agencies operate.
Yet differences in the outcome of merger reviews across the jurisdictions have been a particular focus of recent controversy. In 1997, while I was Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics,
In both jurisdictions,

the FTC declined to challenge Boeing’s acquisition of rival aircraft manufacturer McDonnell
Douglas, while the European Commission allowed the same transaction to proceed only on con-

the focus of merger

dition that Boeing modify long-term exclusive contracts with three major airlines.
That merger review was conducted against the backdrop of a highly politicized competition for

analysis is now

customers between Boeing, a U.S. firm, and Airbus, a European manufacturer, in the commercial
aircraft market. The differences in outcome between the two regimes in that case may plausibly be

squarely on identifying

explained by the subtle distinction between lessening of competition (the concern under U.S. law)
and abuse of a dominant position (then the concern in merger review under EU law), combined with

harm to consumers.

greater worry in Europe about the harmful potential of exclusionary vertical practices. Some commentators nevertheless cynically suggested that the competition authorities in the two jurisdictions
were each protecting the interests of their national champion, a consideration that I do not ever
recall being discussed in antitrust decision making during my governmental experience.
A more consequential spat arose in 2001, when the European Commission opposed General
Electric’s acquisition of Honeywell shortly after the same transaction had been cleared in the
United States by the DOJ. With remarkable frankness, senior U.S. antitrust officials publicly questioned whether the competitive effects theory relied upon by DG-Comp in that case made economic sense. Critics also suggested that the European competition policy system is too solicitous
to the concerns of complaining rivals at the expense of protecting customers and consumers,
insufficiently attentive to procompetitive efficiencies, and too willing to pursue industrial policy
goals rather than trusting that market outcomes will promote social welfare. European and U.S.
competition law and enforcement policy also differ to some extent outside the merger area, particularly with respect to the evaluation of exclusionary conduct allegations involving vertical agreements or the practices of dominant firms. In these areas, U.S. courts and enforcers appear generally less inclined to challenge such conduct as anticompetitive and more inclined to credit
efficiency justifications than are their European counterparts.
Many U.S. commentators historically preferred the U.S. enforcement system and its outcomes
to what they saw in the EU. In their view, the United States was more committed to basing
enforcement decisions on the economic analysis of a merger’s effects and more skeptical about
the validity of complaints by rivals. Whatever the merits of such concerns in the past, any such differences are disappearing in merger analysis today. In both jurisdictions, the focus of merger
analysis is now squarely on identifying harm to consumers. In 2004, Europe adopted a new merger regulation that prohibited mergers creating a significant impediment to effective competition,1

1

Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC
Merger Regulation).
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a standard similar to the substantial lessening of competition test employed in U.S. law. The preamble to the regulation, which noted the procompetitive potential of efficiencies from merger, decisively rejected an older view that efficiencies could harm competition, much as modern merger
rulings by U.S. appellate courts have not followed U.S. Supreme Court precedents from the 1960s
that could similarly be read to treat efficiencies from merger as an offense, not a defense. The new
merger regulation has conferred legitimacy on the modern emphasis at DG-Comp on reviewing
transactions for their effects, not their form, focusing on developing a coherent economic theory
of the case, and treating efficiencies as a defense.
The new merger regulation followed several reforms in the bureaucratic structure of DG-Comp,
including the appointment of a Chief Competition Economist and the establishment of an internal
scrutiny panel to provide peer review in major cases. In addition, the Merger Task Force was formally disbanded, with merger review staff allocated to units within divisions assigned to broad
The one time I

industry sectors, although the merger units also continue to work together under the supervision
of the Deputy Director-General for Mergers through what is called the Merger Network.

observed internal

The enforcement culture in Europe has changed as well. The one time I observed internal advocacy of an efficiency offense at DG-Comp, it came from outside the Merger Network, and the

advocacy of an

merger staff on the case recoiled in horror. Moreover, the Chief Economist has already established
himself as a significant player in agency deliberations. His team is staffed by serious and talent-

efficiency offense at

ed Ph.D economists, and it operates like a nascent Economic Analysis Group (at the DOJ Antitrust
Division) or Bureau of Economics (at the FTC). But the Chief Economist’s team will probably need

DG-Comp, it came

to triple in size before it can systematically play a role comparable to what agency economics
groups do in the United States. (Other good economists with doctoral degrees work at DG-Comp,

from outside the

but their position outside an economics group, reporting to non-economists, likely reduces their
effectiveness in making economic arguments. Other DG-Comp staffers have some economics

Merger Network,

training and an economic orientation, much like some attorneys in the U.S. agencies, but they
seem more effective in advancing economic thinking when their ideas are validated by the eco-

and the merger staff

nomics group.)

on the case recoiled

Alternative Enforcement Models
The most important difference between the enforcement agencies is not in their relative commit-

in horror.

ment to economic analysis but in the institutional demands of their respective legal systems.
Antitrust enforcement in the United States is built upon an adversarial model. At the end of the
process, if the agency has concerns about a merger or other firm conduct that the firms involved
dispute, the agency cannot insist upon its view without proving the likelihood of harm to competition to a district court judge (or to the Commissioners of the FTC acting as though they were a
district court). As a result, the conversation in the agencies, law firms, and courts about firm conduct routinely centers around the development of, and comparison between, two competing stories: a “bad-guy” story of why the practice or transaction might harm competition and a “goodguy” story about why it might enhance competition or create efficiencies.
This comparison between theories can be implicit, existing unarticulated in the minds of investigators, or it can become an explicit contest, as when litigation arises. Advocates for firms under
investigation use White Papers and presentations to promote a procompetitive story and undermine anticompetitive alternatives. Agency investigators, working with facts unavailable to the
firms, refine both stories, and at times come up with better procompetitive theories than those of
the outside advocates. The availability of alternative theories helps shape the development of evidence at the U.S. agencies—even when the prospects of litigation are remote, as in most merg-
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er reviews, by focusing attention on the possible facts that would discriminate between the procompetitive and anticompetitive interpretations.
Antitrust enforcement in the European Union is not based on an adversarial model but is built
instead upon an administrative model, more consistent with the civil law tradition of continental
Europe. DG-Comp investigates and enforces as a neutral expert body, acting in U.S. terms both
as prosecutor and judge. Particularly when undertaking a sectoral inquiry or enforcing the
European prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position, the agency may tend to view itself as
having an ongoing regulatory relationship with industry—not as a price regulator, but as a watchdog over market structure and competitor access to networks, inputs, and customers. Under such
circumstances, only one story would naturally be on the table in the minds of investigators: an anticompetitive theory, to be proved or disproved. Agency investigation would focus on assembling
. . . the focus of the

and evaluating the elements of this theory. Consistent with this view, internal advocacy of an alternative theory seemed counter to the DG-Comp culture in the merger investigations I observed.

internal conversation—

Some alternative theory may (perhaps must) lurk in the background, but the focus of the internal
conversation—even early in a merger investigation, before tentative conclusions had been

even early in a merger

reached—was on refining and evaluating the bad-guy story, not on testing it against a good-guy
story.

investigation, before

The European approach has a number of advantages. European antitrust institutions may provide more guidance to firms seeking to comply with the antitrust laws than do their U.S. counter-

tentative conclusions

parts. A single enforcement agency led largely by career officials can perhaps establish and
adhere to precedents more readily than occurs in the decentralized U.S. system of multiple

had been reached—

enforcers and multiple courts (notwithstanding that the concept of establishing and following
precedent is not central to civil law). Moreover, an agency that does not expect to prove its case

was on refining and

in an adversarial judicial proceeding can afford to be more transparent than one always conscious
of protecting its legal position. In the merger context, transparency in the European Union is abet-

evaluating the bad-guy

ted by the requirement that DG-Comp affirmatively decide the case one way or the other and publish its findings and reasons and by the requirement that European enforcers provide the merg-

story, not on testing it

ing parties with a written statement of objections, laying out their preliminary concerns, with time
to permit the parties to reply before a final decision is made. By contrast, the U.S. agencies need

against a good-guy

only explain their decisions when they choose to challenge a case, and in the United States, a
decision not to prosecute is left to agency discretion and is not appealable. In addition, enforce-

story.

ment agency culture differs as to internal transparency between the European Union and the
United States. The DG-Comp leadership routinely shares with its staff more information about management issues and the decision-making process in individual cases handled by other teams than
is shared by its U.S. counterparts.
On the other hand, the adversarial model likely encourages developing and testing of evidence
in a way that the administrative model does not. A case team at a U.S. enforcement agency envisioning the possibility of merger litigation is forced to focus on developing admissible evidence
and probing for infirmities in the evidence supporting both the good-guy and bad-guy story that
could be exposed during cross-examination. The agency will assemble documents, data, and testimony, and likely integrate that evidence through the testimony of an expert economist, who will
be subject to cross-examination by the merging parties and scrutiny by the judge. A U.S. case
team knows that it will bear the burden of proof in court and that it must establish anticompetitive
effects by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, documentary requests are extensive.
Documents are not simply read; their interpretation is confirmed through deposition testimony.
Affidavits are not taken at face value. All too often, experienced agency staff have observed that
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in affidavit wars—the occasional back and forth in which agency staff and the parties develop
competing affidavits from witnesses at the same firm (or even from the same witness)—statements
that initially seem clear become qualified to the point where they say nothing or come close to supporting the opposite position. When econometric evidence is important, the construction of data
sets is reviewed in detail and the conclusions derived from data analyses are throughly tested for
robustness. Even in the common situation in which the prospects of litigation are remote, investigative teams with litigation experience cannot help but think about evidence in this way, though
they do not pursue testing of evidence with the same intensity as they employ when a court date
is on the horizon.
A case team at DG-Comp also interviews witnesses and reviews documents and data.
However, relatively more of the record in Europe comes from responses to questionnaires sent to
the merging firms, rivals, and customers—sources closer to affidavits than depositions when
translated into U.S. terms. My impression is that DG-Comp case teams do not feel subject to the
same pressure to test and support their conclusions as do their U.S. counterparts, and may not
go to the same lengths in uncovering and analyzing evidence. A flurry of decisions of Europe’s
Court of First Instance (CFI) during 2002 criticized DG-Comp conclusions in merger investigations as insufficiently grounded in an evidentiary record, putting pressure on the European
agency to review its approach to issues of proof.2 (The CFI undertakes the initial review when
European Commission decisions are challenged; ultimate review is by the European Court of
Justice.) Although these decisions have increased the care with which evidence is discussed
while decisions are drafted, they do not appear to have altered fundamentally how case teams
uncover and evaluate evidence.

Suggestions for the U.S. Agencies
The powerful incentives for developing and testing evidence created by the adversarial approach
of the United States may at times lead to wasted resources. The extensive evidentiary production
in the typical second request, supplied by the merging parties at great expense and substantial
loss of executive time, is largely chaff and not wheat. Certainly, in retrospect, much appears wasted. But whether it is possible to screen out the valuable nuggets and leave behind less valuable
material without first creating a large evidentiary production for agency sifting is far from clear, and
is the subject of ongoing conversations between the enforcement agencies and the defense bar.
In addition, much of the massive effort involved in trial preparation on both sides of the case has
little social value, notwithstanding its litigation benefit to the parties.
DG-Comp’s experience with evaluating mergers using the responses to questionnaires suggests a model that the U.S. enforcement agencies could test for reaching decisions with less burden to the parties after a second request has been issued. The agencies might experiment with
encouraging merging firms initially to answer only a set of interrogatories (along with any other voluntary production the firms wish to supply). The agency could make a commitment to decide within a short period following receipt of those answers whether to close the investigation or to insist
upon full compliance with the second request. Based on the DG-Comp experience, it may turn out
that a significant fraction of investigations can be closed based on such limited information.

2

Airtours plc v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-2585 (Ct. First Instance 2002); Cases T-310/01 & T-77/02, Schneider Elec. SA v. Commission,
[2002] E.C.R. II-4071 (Ct. First Instance 2002); Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-4381 (Ct. First Instance 2002), aff’d, Cases
C-12/03 P & C-13/03 P (Eur. Ct. Justice Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:62003J0013:EN:HTML.
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The adversarial process also demands and, at times, creates advocates at all stages of the
process and potentially among all participants. Once open-minded investigators shift in their
minds to partisan advocacy, they may harden their position and lose their detachment, making it
in some respects more difficult for decision makers to have a clear view of the facts and issues.
By contrast, the administrative approach may encourage a more open-minded investigation
throughout the process. This problem is mitigated in the U.S. agencies to some extent by the presence of multiple layers of review, which brings in new, dispassionate analysts at later stages of the
investigation. The European example suggests the importance of protecting the bureaucratic
independence of evaluation committees in the U.S. enforcement agencies.

Suggestions for DG-Comp
My suspicion . . . is

My suspicion, based on limited observations, is that DG-Comp could benefit from increasing its
effort to develop and test evidence. One possibility for encouraging this result in the merger area

that DG-Comp could

would be to introduce more adversarial elements into the review process. There has long been
one such element: the ability of merging firms, along with the parties to potentially adverse deci-

benefit from increasing

sions involving agreements or monopolization, to obtain a hearing at DG-Comp. Recently, however, some merging firms have declined to seek such a hearing, apparently on the view that hear-

its effort to develop and

ings may benefit third-party complainants more than the merging parties. The reforms of the past
few years—particularly the creation of the Chief Economist’s role and team and the introduction

test evidence.

of internal scrutiny panels—have also added some adversarial aspects to the administrative
process. But further steps could be taken.
DG-Comp could push its internal process even more in an adversarial direction by creating in
every serious (Phase II) merger investigation a small advocacy team charged with both laying out
the evidence in support of a procompetitive interpretation of firm conduct and highlighting where
the evidence supporting the anticompetitive theory is weak. The internal scrutiny panel, as part
of its own case review, could then hold what would amount to an oral argument between the case
team and the internal advocates for the merger, without witnesses, but emphasizing reference
to the material in the case file, in order to sharpen the internal focus on collecting and testing
evidence.
In the European system, this kind of informal mini-trial would more appropriately be held within DG-Comp than left for judicial review at the Court of First Instance. Notwithstanding the
agency’s recent court losses, it is hard to see how external judicial review could systematically test
DG-Comp’s evidence given the way the European system is now set up. Unlike a U.S. District
Court, the Court of First Instance has no serious institutional capability to collect or test evidence
beyond review of the file developed by DG-Comp. The European court’s rules do not allow for discovery, rulings on admissibility of evidence, cross examination, or the like. When translated into
U.S. terms, judicial review in the European Union appears to be closer to appellate review than to
district court review. Even in its recent decisions critical of DG-Comp, the Court of First Instance
at least arguably seems to be acting within the range of what U.S. appeals courts do when they
review facts under a clearly erroneous standard while undertaking de novo review of the law.
Although, the CFI’s Chief Judge has called for a more robust review of the facts in his court,3 it is
hard to see how this system could evolve into U.S.-style judicial review without fundamentally
changing its character.

3

Bo Vesterdorf, Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case Law of the Community Courts, 1 E UR . C OMP. J.
3 (2005).
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In theory, DG-Comp could also encourage itself to devote greater attention to evidence by
empowering the merging parties to do more to challenge the agency’s theory and frame an alternative during the merger review process. One possibility relates to procompetitive benefits. The
parties to any merger likely to draw scrutiny in the United States routinely set forth a procompetitive explanation for their transaction (or at least a competitively benign one like tax savings) at the
time of notification—not because they necessarily expect to win on an efficiency defense, but to
prevent the agency from inferring an anticompetitive motive from the absence of a rationale and
to frame for the agency a good-guy story of the transaction. By contrast, merging parties in the
EU appear reluctant to detail any procompetitive benefits they foresee, notwithstanding the
requirement on Europe’s Form CO (the initial premerger notification filing) that they describe the
“economic rationale” for the deal. The merging firms appear to fear that the DG-Comp staff would
interpret such a pitch as a signal that the parties view their transaction as potentially raising serious competitive problems absent the efficiencies, and they may also have a lingering concern that
efficiencies would be viewed as anticompetitive. This reluctance could perhaps be overcome if
the DG-Comp staff would routinely seek clarification when the parties merely cite unspecified synergies or otherwise choose not to explain in more than a cursory manner why their merger is procompetitive or benign.
In addition, the merging parties could be encouraged to challenge DG-Comp’s conjectures as
to evidence in an early stage, in order to focus the agency on identifying where it needs to develop evidentiary support. DG-Comp already has instituted some institutional mechanisms to promote this end, including a “State of Play” meeting with the merging parties and a procedure for
obtaining merging firm comment on key documents obtained from third parties. Still, merging
firms appear reluctant to address potential anticompetitive theories before learning what concerns
DG-Comp, for fear of directing the agency to competitive concerns that it would not otherwise
investigate.

Advice for Merging Firms
How should merging firms and their attorneys and economists navigate within the European system? Notwithstanding the administrative nature of DG-Comp review, outside advocates can help
shape the initial expectations of agency staff toward favoring the deal and help support that outcome by supplying evidence to favor a procompetitive theory of the case or undermine an anticompetitive one. Such evidence will get a hearing within an agency increasingly attuned to
effects, economics, and efficiencies, and pressured by its reviewing court on evidence.
One practical suggestion is already employed to some extent by outside counsel: on any
potentially controversial deal, use Form CO to frame and support an alternative to the anticompetitive story DG-Comp is likely to investigate. The response to the questions in Form CO can be
prefaced by a mini-White Paper, laying out an integrated alternative theory of the transaction, providing evidence for it, and referring to later responses to specific questions as appropriate. The
merging parties should not hesitate to set forth a procompetitive or benign explanation for the
transaction up front, as the benefits from shaping the initial expectations of DG-Comp staff today
likely outweigh any lingering concerns that the agency would take the wrong message or identify an efficiency offense. A clear statement of anticipated efficiencies may also discourage the staff
from pursuing remedies that would undermine the procompetitive benefits of the deal and make
no practical business sense for the parties.
The parties should also seek to undermine an anticompetitive theory early in the investigation
by using the answer to Form CO to present evidence on issues that the merging firms must
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address or defenses that the agency would expect the firms to be in the best position to address
if they were important. Unlike the practice in the United States, merging firms in Europe are
required to define the antitrust markets in which they participate. The merging firms should support their market definition with evidence of the likely patterns of buyer substitution that underlies
it. To the extent counsel can work with friendly customers in advance to buttress that position, in
preparation for customer interviews by DG-Comp staff, that too could be helpful. There is also little downside to the merging parties today in providing evidence in an initial filing as to ease of
entry (or repositioning) and efficiencies. These are often areas of inquiry where it would be helpful to counteract the views of complaining rivals.
The more difficult tactical question is how far the merging firms should go initially in addressing possible theories of adverse competitive effect. If an obvious theory that DG-Comp would pursue involves the unilateral effect of loss of localized competition among sellers of differentiated
products, that theory should be countered up front because the evidence involved is likely the
same buyer substitution considerations as would be adduced in support of the parties’ market
definition. But the firms may wish to wait before addressing competitive effects theories involving
coordination or exclusion until hearing how they are framed by agency staff, to avoid wasting their
own effort on theories deemed implausible by enforcers and avoid suggesting avenues of investigation to agency staff. Whether or not competitive effects are addressed early, outside counsel
who choose to make economic arguments from the start should work with economists on framing
and testing them, much the way DG-Comp increasingly does internally. By making a sophisticated economic argument, the parties can encourage the early and in-depth involvement of the Chief
Economist’s team in the analysis of their transaction.
This advice is on the whole similar to the way counsel for merging firms deal with the antitrust
enforcement agencies in the United States. That should not be a surprise. After all, as European
antitrust enforcement has grown in sophistication, its approach to merger analysis has increasingly come to resemble the way mergers are reviewed in the United States. With the growth in
cooperation between agencies in the review of transatlantic mergers, and the extensive dialogue
among enforcement agencies worldwide through institutions like the International Competition
Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), this
trend toward convergence seems likely to continue. 

